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A strategic analysis of incorporating CSR into managerial incentive design  
 
 
Abstract  
A strategic analysis is conducted to incorporate corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
considerations into managerial incentive design in a duopoly where each firm comprises an 
owner and a manager. Consumer surplus is adopted to represent the firms’ CSR concerns and a 
CSR-related incentive is introduced to accommodate both profit and consumer surplus. Bertrand 
and Cournot competition modes are discussed with the firms’ products being complementary, 
independent, or substitutable. We first examine the equilibrium of CSR-related incentive design 
and, then, analyze how CSR-related incentives affect the firms’ profitability and CSR 
performance, measured by consumer surplus and social welfare.  
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; Managerial incentive design; Bertrand competition; 
Cournot competition; Product relationship; Equilibrium.  
 
1. Introduction  
Increasing attention has been paid to corporate social responsibility (CSR) in both practice 
and academia. A large number of companies issue various CSR statements/activities in their 
annual reports. A CSR trend report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers suggested that the number of 
companies with CSR statements on their websites increased to 81% at the end of July 2010 from 
75% at the end of July 2009. Another international survey by KPMG in 2008 showed that nearly 
80% of the world’s largest 250 companies disclosed CSR reports, up from 50% in 2005. In job 
markets, 88% of the job seekers would choose employers based on strong CSR values and 86% 
would consider leaving if the companies’ CSR values no longer met their expectations 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2011). The empirical studies above indicate that CSR has become an 
important consideration from the perspective of various entities such as shareholders, managers 
and consumers. Similarly, Vogel (2005) pointed out that 70% of the global chief executives 
believe that CSR activities are vital to their companies’ profitability, suggesting that CSR is 
critical to firms’ overall strategy and success. Furthermore, Lee (2008) observed that, although 
the link between CSR and firms’ profitability is getting tighter, but it remains unclear whether it 
is positive or negative. Motivated by these works, we attempt to provide a possible explanation 
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for the relationship between CSR and firms’ profitability from a theoretical perspective.  
Following the research in Goering (2007) and Kopel and Brand (2012), this paper adopts 
consumer surplus as a proxy of the firms’ CSR concerns and introduces a CSR-related incentive 
combining both profitability and consumer surplus. We study the strategic design of such CSR-
related incentives in a duopoly where each firm consists of an owner and a manager. We can find 
duopolistic competition in the Canadian logistics industry such as the Canadian National and 
Canadian Pacific Railways. It is supposed that each firm owner can choose a weight on CSR to 
influence its manager’s market decision. First, we discuss whether the profit-driven firm owners 
have motivation to offer their managers the CSR-related incentives. Second, we examine the 
effect of the CSR-related incentives on the firms’ profitability and CSR performance as reflected 
by consumer surplus and social welfare. We consider two market competition modes, Bertrand 
and Cournot, and three product relationships: complementary, independent and substitutable 
products. Bertrand and Cournot competition modes are both common in the logistics industry 
(Brander and Zhang, 1990, 1993; Oum et al., 1993; Lijesen, 2004). Specifically, our research 
questions are: Can the CSR-related incentives endogenously arise in equilibrium? If so, what is 
the impact of such incentives on firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social welfare? How 
do the competition mode and product relationship affect the equilibrium results and why?  
Due to separation of ownership and management, contemporary firms are often 
characterized by managerial delegation, where shareholders can induce professional managers to 
operate their firms based on certain managerial incentives. Furthermore, the importance of 
integrating CSR into managerial incentives has been discussed in existing research. Business 
experts such as management scholars and compensation advisors tend to suggest a change in the 
CEO compensation contract to incorporate CSR as part of the CEO remuneration (Coombs and 
Gilley, 2005; Mahoney and Thorn, 2006). As reported by Dahlsrud (2008), despite many debates 
on what CSR really embraces, stakeholders’ concerns are one of the most important dimensions 
of CSR and consumers are admittedly among the most influential stakeholders of a firm. Russell 
Reynolds Associates reported that 76 percent of investors consider incentive mechanisms as 
either important or very important when dealing with social issues (Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 
2009).  
Although previous research discussed CSR from the perspective of enhancing firms’ public 
image, we take a different stance by examining CSR-related managerial incentive design from a 
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strategic competition perspective, which is an important topic (Porter and Kramer, 2006). A key 
finding is that the competing profit-driven owners always design the CSR-related incentive in 
equilibrium (which is reduced to the pure-profit incentive with independent products). 
Furthermore, for correlated products, we show that the owners’ strategic design of CSR-related 
incentives does not necessarily enhance their profitability, but they always employ such 
incentives in equilibrium for strategic competition purposes. Specifically, we find that the CSR-
related incentives serve as the owners’ strategic competition device to obtain more advantage 
(under Cournot competition with complementary products and Bertrand competition with 
substitutable products) or evade disadvantage (under Cournot competition with substitutable 
products and Bertrand competition with complementary products). Compared with the 
benchmark pure-profit incentives, the CSR-related incentives can either increase or decrease the 
firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social welfare. In the case that both firms’ profits are 
worsened by engaging in CSR-related incentives, the firms are forced to do so because they are 
trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where the scenario that both firms’ profits are better off without 
considering CSR is not an equilibrium. In addition, if one firm embraces CSR-related incentives 
but the other does not, the latter’s profit will be even further worsened. The managerial insights 
behind our results are as follows: First, whether the firms enhance their profitability by designing 
the CSR-related incentives depends on both product relationship and the competition mode. 
Second, whether the CSR-related managerial incentive design is beneficial to consumer surplus 
and social welfare depends only on the competition mode.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the previous 
literature related to this study. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the endogenous design of the CSR-
related incentives under Cournot and Bertrand competition modes, respectively. The paper 
concludes in Section 5 with some remarks and suggestions for future research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
In general, this paper is related to two strands of literature: CSR and managerial incentive 
design. First, CSR has attracted significant attention since 1960s, mainly driven by forward-
thinking academics and social movements such as consumer rights and environmental 
regulations, especially in the US. Initially, in the 1960s and 1970s, CSR was motivated by social 
rather than economic considerations. Firms were trying to be philanthropic instead of expecting 
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more profit from their CSR activities. Later, CSR research emphasized the relationship between 
CSR and firm profitability (Vogel, 2005). Analogously, Lee (2008) observed that the link 
between CSR and firms’ profits is getting tighter, but it remains unclear whether it is positive or 
negative. For more understanding on CSR, readers are referred to Carroll and Shabana (2010) 
and Schreck (2011) for excellent reviews. The aforementioned studies are either qualitative or 
empirical, while we examine CSR-related incentive design using an analytical model, which is 
identified as an important topic by Lee (2008). By considering CSR-related managerial incentive 
design from the perspective of strategic competition rather than philanthropy, we provide a 
possible theoretical explanation for the link between CSR and firms’ profitability.  
Regarding other theoretical works, Goering (2008a) examined the durability decision of a 
durable-goods monopoly with and without consumer welfare related social concern and found 
that such social concern increases product durability if the firm can commit to its stakeholders, 
while the opposite emerges otherwise. Goering (2010) further explored whether social concern 
can increase a durable-goods firm’s profit and showed that the result depends on whether the 
firm has the ability to make commitments in the sales market. Two differences exist between our 
research and the aforesaid studies. First, existing research considered a monopolistic market, 
while we consider a duopoly under two competition modes. Second, we integrate CSR into 
managerial delegation in a private duopoly and discuss how such CSR-related incentive design 
affects the firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social welfare, while Goering (2008a; 2010) 
did not consider managerial incentive design. Barcos et al. (2013) examined the relationship 
between inventory investment and firms’ CSR activities directed toward stakeholders. Apart 
from the difference in research techniques, our focus is on the strategic design of the CSR-related 
managerial incentives, whereas they discussed operational consequences of certain CSR 
activities. Ye and Mukhopadhyay (2013) investigated altruistic behavior with CSR-related social 
concerns between two competing vertically-differentiated firms. Our paper differs as we focus 
on CSR-related incentive design, which is not considered by Ye and Mukhopadhyay (2013). 
Unlike existing research, we focus on the endogenous design of CSR-related managerial 
incentives with horizontal product differentiation under different competition modes.  
CSR has also been studied in supply chains, either qualitatively and empirically (Boyd et al., 
2005, 2007; Amaeshi et al., 2008; Carter et al., 2000; Carter and Jennings, 2002; Miao et al., 
2012; Ageron et al., 2012), or using analytical models (Brand and Grothe, 2013; Cruz, 2008; 
6 
Cruz and Wakolbinger, 2008; Goering, 2012, 2013; Hsueh, 2015; Ni et al., 2010; Ni and Li, 
2012; Panda, 2014; Panda et al., 2015; Xia et al., 2015). While the aforementioned works studied 
CSR in supply chains, we discuss whether duopolistic firms have social concerns under different 
modes of horizontal competition. Furthermore, we combine the prevalent managerial incentives 
with CSR and explore whether the firms are engaged in the CSR-related incentives in 
equilibrium and how such incentives affect the firms’ profitability, consumer surplus and social 
welfare.  
The second strand of related research lies in managerial incentive design literature. The 
pioneer works in this respect are reported by Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and 
Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). This body of literature explored the strategic effect of incentives 
with endogenous weights on sales and firm profitability. Subsequently, extensive research has 
emerged by designing managerial incentives based on relative performance (Joh, 1999; 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Miller and Pazgal, 2001, 2002; Asseburg and Hofmann, 2010), 
market share (Jansen et al., 2007, 2012; Ritz, 2008; Wang et al., 2009), process innovation and 
product quality (Ishibashi, 2001; Overvest and Veldman, 2008; Veldman and Gaalman, 2014; 
Veldman et al., 2014), to name a few. Our research differs from the above works in that we 
consider the CSR-related managerial incentives incorporating consumer surplus into profitability, 
which enable us to examine whether firms have social concerns on consumers and how the 
outcomes vary with competition modes and product relationships. Some studies focused on sales 
incentive design in the context of mixed oligopolies where not-for-profit public firms compete 
with private firms (Barros, 1995; White, 2001; Heywood and Ye, 2009; Tomaru et al., 2011; Du 
et al., 2013; Kopel and Marini, 2014). In contrast, we focus on two competing private firms’ 
CSR-related incentive design. For more research on strategic incentive design, readers are 
referred to Sengul et al. (2012).  
Yet, limited research investigated CSR-related managerial incentives. For instance, Goering 
(2007) examined a mixed duopoly consisting of a public not-for-profit firm and a profit-driven 
private firm, where the not-for-profit firm designs its managerial incentives based on consumer 
surplus. Within the same mixed duopoly, Kopel and Brand (2012) extended the work of Goering 
(2007) by allowing the private firm to design its sales-oriented managerial incentive. Goering 
(2008b) discussed the welfare effect in a mixed oligopoly and found that a shift from the pure-
profit behavior by a not-for-profit firm may decrease social welfare. Since CSR is not merely 
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restricted to public or not-for-profit firms, our research differs from the works above in several 
aspects. First, we examine two private firms’ endogenous design of the CSR-related incentives, 
while their research assumed that only the public firm adopts CSR-related incentives and the 
private firm is merely sales driven. Second, we consider both Cournot and Bertrand competition 
modes with differentiated goods, but they only studied Cournot competition with homogenous 
goods.  
 
3. The model and incentive analysis under Cournot competition  
Consider two firms, firms 1 and 2, characterized by separate management and ownership. 
Each firm (firm i) consists of an owner (owner i) who owns the firm and a manager (manager i) 
who makes market decisions based on the incentive contract designed by the corresponding firm 
owner.  
Following Singh and Vives (1984), we assume the standard consumer surplus as  
 ( ) ( )
gross utility
expenditure
2 21 ( ) ,  , 1, 2;
2
i j i j i j i i j jCS q q q q q q p q p q i j i j 
 
= + − + − − + =  
 
,  (1) 
where CS  stands for consumer surplus, and ip  and ( )1,2iq i =  denote product i’s retail price and 
quantity, respectively. Note that the first term of the right-hand side of Eq. (1) denotes the gross 
utility of consumers before purchase, while the second term represents consumers’ total payment 
for purchasing ( )1,2iq i =  units of products. Overall, the difference between these two terms 
denotes the consumer surplus after purchase. This form of utility function yields the linear 
demand structure as shown in Eq. (2) (Singh and Vives, 1984). 
Maximizing Eq. (1) with respect to quantities, we obtain the inverse demand as  
 ( ), ,  , 1,2;i i j i jp q q q q i j i j = − − =  ,  (2) 
  is the reservation price and ( )1,1  −  measures product differentiation with ( )1,0  − , 0 and 
( )0,1   representing complementary, independent, and substitutable products, respectively. 
Inverting Eq. (2), we obtain the direct demand as  
 ( )
( )
2
1
, ,  , 1,2;
1
i j
i i j
p p
q p p i j i j
  

− − +
= = 
−
.  (3) 
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This section adopts Eq. (2) to examine CSR-related incentive design under Cournot 
competition. The case of Bertrand competition is analyzed in Section 4 by using Eq. (3). To 
focus on the strategic effect, both firms’ marginal costs are normalized to zero, which also helps 
to avoid unnecessary complexity without qualitatively changing our results.  
Based on the seminal works of Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas 
(1987), we consider whether the profit-driven firm owners endogenously design the CSR-related 
incentives in equilibrium. Each manager’s compensation structure contains a fixed lump-sum 
payment 
iF  plus a variable component that is proportional to a linear combination of profit and 
consumer surplus i iCS +  under the CSR-related incentive, where i  and i  are firm i’s 
profit and incentive parameter/weight, respectively. Thus, each manager’s salary is given by 
i i iF +   under the pure-profit incentive or ( )i i i iF CS +  +  under the CSR-related incentive, 
where i  is a positive scale parameter to the variable portion of the compensation. Without loss 
of generality, it is assumed that each manager’s highest reservation utility from outside 
opportunities is U . Mathematically, owner i’s problem under the CSR-related incentive is given 
by  
 
( )
( )
, ,
. .
i i i
Oi i i i i i
F
Mi i i i i
Max F CS
s t
U F CS U
 
 
 
  =  − +  +  




= +  + 
,  (4) 
where the subscripts ‘Oi’ and ‘Mi’ denote owner i and manager i, respectively. Apparently, each 
owner will set the values of iF  and i  to adjust its manager’s compensation such that the 
constraint in Eq. (4) becomes binding, i.e., ( )i i i iF U CS = −  + . This incentive structure is a 
standard two-part tariff contract which will not distort the managers’ decisions. Based on this, 
manager i’s problem under the CSR-related incentive is to maximize his/her compensation 
Mi i iU CS=  +  by setting a price (or quantity) and owner i’s problem is to maximize 
Oi i U = −  by setting an optimal CSR weight. Since U  is a constant, owner i’s problem is 
equivalent to profit maximization.  
Based on the discussions above, we see that each manager’s problem is to maximize its 
compensation stipulated by the CSR incentive and each owner’s objective is to choose the 
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optimal incentive weight for profit maximization.  
We consider the following sequence of decisions. In the first stage, the owners 
simultaneously decide the endogenous weights of the CSR-related incentives for profit 
maximization. In the second stage, given the CSR-related incentives offered by their owners, the 
managers compete by simultaneously setting the quantities (or prices under Bertrand competition 
in Section 4) of the products in the product market. In what follows, we employ backward 
induction to ensure sub-game perfection.  
Under the CSR-related incentives, the managers’ problems are given by  
 ( ), ,  , 1,2;
i
Q
Mi i i j i i
q
MaxU p q q q CS i j i j= + =  .  (5) 
where the superscript ‘Q’ indicates Cournot competition mode.  
The first-order conditions (FOCs) can be obtained by substituting the inverse demand into 
Eq. (5) and differentiating each manager’s objective with respect to its corresponding quantity. 
Solving the FOCs yields the optimal responses as  
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
1 2 1
1
2 1
2 1 2
2
1
,
2
1
,
2
Q
Q
q
q q
q
q q
  


  


− −
=
−

− − =
 −
.  (6) 
The intersection of the managers’ reactions in Eq. (6) determines the equilibrium quantities 
as functions of incentive weights ( )1,2i i = :  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
2 1
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
2 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 1
,
2 2 1 1
2 1
,
2 2 1 1
Q
Q
q
q
   
 
    
   
 
    
 − − −  =
− − − − −

− − −   = − − − − −
.  (7) 
We first denote the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives with ( )0 1,2Qi i = = . The 
optimal solutions under this case can be obtained by substituting ( )0 1,2Qi i = =  into Eq. (7) 
and then backward. We summarize the results under the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) 
incentives in the second column of Table 1.  
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In order to compare with the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives, in what follows we 
solve for optimal CSR incentive weights. Substituting Eq. (7) into the owners’ profit functions 
and solving them, we have  
 
( )
2 2 42 2 4 8 4
, 1,2
2 1
Q
i i
    


+ + − + + +
= =
+
.  (8) 
Based on Eq. (8), other optimal solutions under the CSR-related incentives are obtained and 
summarized in the last column of Table 1.  
Table 1. Solutions under Cournot competition. 
 Pure-profit incentives CSR-related incentives 
Incentive 
weight 
 
0 ( )
2 2 42 2 4 8 4
2 1
    

+ + − + + +
+
 
 
Price 
2

+
 ( )2 4 2
2 4 2
4 8 4 2
4 8 4 2
     
   
+ + + − −
+ + + + −
 
 
Quantity 
2

+
 
2 2 4
2
2 4 8 4

   − + + + +
 
 
Profit ( )
2
2
2

+
 ( )
( )
2 4 2 2
2
2 4 2
2 4 8 4 2
4 8 4 2
     
   
+ + + − −
+ + + + −
 
Consumer 
surplus 
( )
( )
2
2
1
2
 

+
+
 
( )
( )
2
2
2 4 2
4 1
4 8 4 2
 
   
+
+ + + + −
 
Social 
welfare 
( )
( )
2
2
3
2
 

+
+
 ( )
( )
2 4 2 2
2
2 4 2
4 4 8 4 1
4 8 4 2
     
   
+ + + + − −
+ + + + −
 
 
We now present the equilibrium incentives under Cournot competition. 
Proposition 1. Under Cournot competition, 0Qi  , where the equality holds if and only if 
0 = . Compared to the pure-profit incentives, the CSR-related incentives enhance both firms’ 
profitability if ( )1,0  −  but make them worse off if ( )0,1  .  
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Proof. See Appendix.  
Proposition 1 indicates that, under the Cournot competition mode, both owners choose the 
pure-profit incentives ( 0
Q
i = ) in equilibrium if the products are independent ( 0 = ). In this 
case, there is no competition between the two firms in the product market (i.e., in Eq. (6), 
iq  
does not interact with 
jq ), and each firm is a monopoly and each owner’s interference using a 
non-zero incentive weight will make its objective deviate from the optimal profitability. Thus, 
the owners engage in the pure-profit incentives by setting 0
Q
i =  in equilibrium without 
interfering with their respective managers’ decisions.  
When the products are complementary or substitutable ( ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  ), each owner 
chooses the CSR-related incentive in equilibrium, with a positive weight on CSR. It is standard 
in managerial economics that the Cournot competition is often not as aggressive as desired 
(Miller and Pazgal, 2001). In this case, each owner’s CSR-related incentive design serves as its 
more aggressive competition. For this purpose, each owner has to set a positive weight on CSR 
(with its manager being rewarded) to induce a higher quantity since a negative weight penalizing 
CSR leads to a lower quantity, which means even less competition. Specifically, given that 
owner 1 chooses the pure-profit incentive, owner 2 will act more aggressively by choosing the 
CSR-related incentive to make more profit, which will benefit (hurt) owner 1 if the products are 
complementary (substitutable). The logic is as follows: as shown in Eq. (6), an increase in one 
firm’s quantity will increase (reduce) the quantity of the other firm if the products are 
complementary (substitutable). In anticipation of this, owner 1 will further intensify the 
competition by switching from the pure-profit incentive to the CSR-related incentive to pursue 
more profit (with complements), or avoid profit loss (with substitutes).  
Generally speaking, the equilibrium CSR-related incentives do not necessarily lead to higher 
profit for the owners compared to the benchmark pure-profit incentives. First, the firms benefit 
from engaging in the CSR-related incentives when products are complementary. This is due to 
the fact that, if the products are complementary ( ( )1,0  − ), the firms’ quantity decisions are 
mutually enhancing: the increase of one firm’s quantity will simultaneously enhance the quantity 
of the other firm (Eq. (6)). On the other hand, when products are substitutable, the CSR-related 
incentives make both owners’ profitability worse off. The reason is as follows: if the products are 
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substitutable ( ( )0,1  ), the firms’ quantity decisions are in conflict with each other, i.e., the 
increase of one firm’s quantity will reduce the quantity supply of the other firm (Eq. (6)).  
 
Proposition 2. ( )1,2Qi i =  increases as products become more substitutable or complementary, 
i.e., Q
i  increases in  .  
Proof. See Appendix.  
Proposition 2 states that, under Cournot competition, the equilibrium weights of the CSR-
related incentives increase as products’ relationship (substitutable or complementary) level 
increases. This is explained as follows. In Cournot competition, the owners employ the CSR-
related incentives to overcome the under-aggressiveness of the managers’ quantity decisions. As 
the products become more related (substitutable or complementary), the interdependence 
between the managers’ interaction become stronger, which motivates the owners to set a higher 
incentive weight to induce the managers to make more aggressive decisions.  
Let 
QCS  and 
Q
CS , respectively, stand for the equilibrium consumer surplus with CSR-
related and pure-profit incentives under Cournot competition.  
Proposition 3. Under Cournot competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to increase 
consumer surplus compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., 
Q
QCS CS  with equality 
holding if and only if 0 = .  
Proof. See Appendix.  
When 0 = , Proposition 1 indicates the CSR-related incentives are reduced to pure-profit 
incentives and, hence, consumer surplus is identical for the two cases. Next, our interpretation 
focuses on the case with correlated products ( 0  ). Proposition 3 suggests that, under Cournot 
competition with correlated products, the CSR-related incentives yield higher consumer surplus 
than the pure-profit incentives do. As the CSR incentive weights are positive in this case, both 
firms can be interpreted as consumer-friendly. Under the CSR-related incentives, each firm 
always produces a higher quantity level than that under the pure-profit incentives, thereby 
resulting in  higher consumer surplus for correlated (substitutable or complementary) products.  
Let 
QSW  and 
Q
SW , respectively, represent the equilibrium social welfare with CSR-
related and pure-profit incentives under Cournot competition. 
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Proposition 4. Under Cournot competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to increase social 
welfare compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., 
Q
QSW SW  with equality holding if and 
only if 0 = .  
Proof. See Appendix.  
Once again, the special case of 0 =  results in the same social welfare for the two 
incentives. For correlated products, Proposition 4 demonstrates that the CSR-related incentives 
yield higher social welfare than the pure-profit incentives do under Cournot competition. The 
reason is as follows. Social welfare comprises firms’ profits and consumer surplus. When the 
products are substitutable, our results suggest that, while both firms’ profits decrease, the 
increase in consumer surplus (Proposition 3) is more than enough to offset the decrease in profit 
(Proposition 1). On the other hand, when the products are complementary, the firms’ profits and 
consumer surplus are both higher under the CSR-related incentives, yielding higher social 
welfare than that under the pure-profit incentives. In sum, under Cournot competition, social 
welfare is always higher under the CSR-related incentives than under the pure-profit incentives 
as long as the products are substitutable or complementary.  
 
4. Incentive analysis under Bertrand competition  
In this section, we proceed to examine the CSR-related incentive design under Bertrand 
competition. The managers’ problems are given by  
 ( ), ,  , 1,2;
i
P
Mi i i i j i
p
MaxU p q p p CS i j i j= + =  .  (9) 
where the superscript ‘P’ indicates the Bertrand competition mode.  
Substituting the inverse demand functions into Eq. (9) and solving the resulting FOCs yield 
the optimal responses as  
 
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
1 1 2
1 2 1
1
2 2 1
2 1 2
2
1 1 1
,
2
1 1 1
,
2
P
P
p
p p
p
p p
    


    


− − + −
=
−

− − + − =
 −
.  (10) 
The intersection of the managers’ reaction functions in Eq. (10) determines the equilibrium 
prices as functions of incentive weights ( )1,2i i = :  
14 
 ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )2
1 1 2 1
, ,  , 1,2;
2 2 1 1
i j jP
i i j
i j i j
p i j i j
     
 
    
 − − − − − = = 
− − − − −
.  (11) 
Similar to Cournot competition, we denote the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives 
under Bertrand competition with ( )0 1,2Pi i = =  for comparison. The optimal solutions under 
the pure-profit (no CSR) incentives can be obtained by substituting ( )0 1,2Pi i = =  into the 
relevant expressions above. We summarize the benchmark results in the second column of Table 
2.  
Now we solve for the optimal CSR incentive weights. Substituting Eq. (11) into the owners’ 
profit functions and solving them, we obtain  
 
2
2
1 1
, 1,2
1
P
i i



− −
= =
−
.  (12) 
Based on Eq. (12), remaining solutions are derived and summarized in the last column of 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Solutions under Bertrand competition. 
 Pure-profit incentives CSR-related incentives 
Incentive 
weight 
 
0 
2
2
1 1
1


− −
−
 
 
Price ( )( )1 2

 + −
 ( )
( )
2
2
1 1
2 1 1
  

 − + −
 
− +
 
 
Quantity 
( )1
2
 

−
−
 ( )
( )( )
2
2
1 1
2 1 1 1
  
 
+ + −
+ − +
  
 
Profit 
( )
( )( )
2
2
1
1 2
 
 
−
+ −
 
( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2
2
2
1 1 1 1
4 1 1 1
    
 
− + − + + −
+ − +
 
Consumer 
surplus ( )( )
2
2
1 2

 + −
 ( )
( )( )
2
2 2
2
2
1 1
4 1 1 1
  
 
+ + −
+ − +
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Social 
welfare 
( )
( )( )
2
2
3 2
1 2
 
 
−
+ −
 ( )( )
( )( )
2 2 2
2
2
1 1 3 3 1
4 1 1 1
    
 
+ + − − + −
+ − +
 
 
Similar to Cournot competition in Section 3, we have  
 
Proposition 5. Under Bertrand competition, 0Pi  , where the equality holds if and only if 
0 = . Compared with the pure-profit incentives, the CSR-related incentives lower both firms’ 
profitability if ( )1,0  − and helps them achieve a win-win outcome if ( )0,1  .  
Proof. See Appendix.  
 Proposition 5 reports that the equilibrium is reduced to the pure-profit incentives ( 0Pi = ) 
if the products are independent ( 0 = ) under Bertrand competition. The reason is the same as 
that under Cournot competition: when the products are independent, there is no competition in 
the product market and both firms are independent monopolies ( ip  and jp  do not interact with 
each other in Eq. (10) when 0 = ).  
 On the other hand, both owners choose the CSR-related incentive strategies in equilibrium 
if the products are complementary or substitutable ( ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  ). Due to the fact that the 
Bertrand mode leads to intense competition in the product market, both owners have incentives 
to lower the degree of competition (Miller and Pazgal, 2001). To this end, each owner sets a 
negative weight on CSR to penalize its manager with the purpose of inducing higher retail prices 
to mitigate competition (a positive weight on CSR leads to lower prices and even more intense 
competition). Specifically, if owner 1 chooses the pure-profit incentive, owner 2 will choose the 
CSR-related incentive to soften the competition for better profit, which will hurt (benefit) owner 
1 if the products are complementary (substitutable). The reason is as follows: as shown in Eq. 
(10), the increase in a firm’s price will decrease (increase) the price of the other firm if the 
products are complementary (substitutable). Knowing this, owner 1 will further soften the 
competition by shifting from the pure-profit incentive to the CSR-related incentive to avert 
disadvantage with complementary products or enhance its profitability with substitutable 
products.  
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 Similar to Proposition 1, compared with the benchmark pure-profit incentives, the 
equilibrium CSR-related incentives do not necessarily guarantee better profits for the owners. 
When the products are complementary ( ( )1,0  − ), the CSR-related incentives make both firm 
owners’ profitability worse off because the firms’ price decisions are in mutual conflict, i.e., the 
increase of one firm’s price will reduce the price of the other firm (Eq. (10)). In contrast, when 
products are substitutable ( ( )0,1  ), both owners benefit from engaging in the CSR-related 
incentives as the firms’ price decisions are mutually enhancing: the rise of one firm’s price will 
simultaneously increase the price of the other firm (Eq. (10)).  
Putting Propositions 1 and 5 together, one can see that the impact of the CSR-related 
incentives on the firms’ profitability is opposite for complementary (substitutable) products 
under Bertrand and Cournot competition modes. In other words, compared with the benchmark 
pure-profit incentives, whether the CSR-related incentives enhance the firms’ profitability 
depends on both product relationship and the competition mode. This result sheds clear insights 
for firm owners: a win-win scenario is achievable and a lose-lose situation can be avoided by 
carefully examining their competition strategy and product relationship and, then designing an 
appropriate managerial incentive accordingly.  
 
Proposition 6. ( )1,2Pi i =  decreases as the products become more substitutable or 
complementary, i.e., P
i  decreases in  .  
Proof. See Appendix.  
Proposition 6 suggests that, under Bertrand competition, the equilibrium weights on the 
CSR-related incentives decrease in the degree of product differentiation. The intuition is as 
follows. In Bertrand competition, both owners employ the CSR-related incentives to soften the 
excessive competition. As the products become more related (substitutable or complementary), 
the interdependence between the managers’ decisions becomes stronger, which motivates the 
owners to set more negative incentive weights to induce the managers to make less competitive 
decisions.  
Let 
PCS  and 
P
CS , respectively, denote the equilibrium consumer surplus with CSR-related 
and pure-profit incentives under Bertrand competition.  
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Proposition 7. Under Bertrand competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to decrease 
consumer surplus compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., 
P
PCS CS  with equality 
holding if and only if 0 = .  
Proof. See Appendix.  
The result in Proposition 7 is in contrast to that of Proposition 3. The special case of 0 =  
is trivial. For correlated products ( 0  ), Proposition 7 suggests that, under Bertrand 
competition, consumer surplus is higher under the pure-profit incentives than that under the 
CSR-related incentives, which is reasonable as a negative CSR incentive weight implies that 
owners are unfriendly to consumers (and, hence, CSR). This implies that, under Bertrand 
competition, the CSR-related incentives are always detrimental to consumer surplus as long as 
the products are not independent. Combining with Proposition 3, for correlated products, we can 
see that whether the CSR-related incentives increase or decrease consumer surplus only depends 
on the competition mode.  
Let 
PSW  and 
P
SW , respectively, express the equilibrium social welfare with CSR-related 
and pure-profit incentives under Bertrand competition. 
Proposition 8. Under Bertrand competition, the CSR-related incentives tend to decrease social 
welfare compared with the pure-profit incentives, i.e., 
P
PSW SW  with equality holding if and 
only if 0 = .  
Proof. See Appendix.  
Once again, the special case of independent products ( 0 = ) leads to identical social 
welfare for the two incentives as CSR-related incentives are reduced to pure-profit profits. For 
correlated products, in contrast to Proposition 4, Proposition 8 shows that social welfare under 
CSR-related incentives is lower than that under pure-profit incentives. The reason is as follows: 
when the products are substitutable, the increase in the firms’ profit (Proposition 5) is 
insufficient to offset the decrease in consumer surplus (Proposition 7). On the other hand, when 
the products are complementary, both the firms’ profits and consumer surplus are reduced, 
leading to lower social welfare. Therefore, under Bertrand competition, social welfare is always 
lower under consumer-unfriendly CSR-related incentives than that under pure-profit incentives 
for correlated products. In combination with Proposition 4, we demonstrate that the competition 
18 
mode determines whether the CSR-related incentives increase or decrease social welfare for 
correlated products. The results of Section 3 and Section 4 are summarized in Table 3 as follows. 
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Table 3. The summary of the results. 
 Cournot competition Bertrand Competition 
Incentive sensitivity 
analysis 
0Qi   increases in   0
P
i   decreases in   
Firms’ profitability Q Q
i i   if ( )1,0  − , with 
equality holding if and only if 0 = . 
Q Q
i i   if ( )0,1  . 
P P
i i   if ( )1,0  − , 
with equality holding if and 
only if 0 = . 
P P
i i   if ( )0,1  . 
Consumer surplus QQCS CS , with equality holding if 
and only if 0 = . 
P
PCS CS , with equality 
holding if and only if 0 = . 
Social welfare QQSW SW , with equality holding 
if and only if 0 = . 
Q
QSW SW , with equality 
holding if and only if 0 = . 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
This paper investigates the strategic design of CSR-related managerial incentives in a 
duopoly and examines both Bertrand and Cournot competition modes. We first analyze whether 
the profit-driven firm owners have motivation to design CSR-related incentives and, then, study 
how such incentives affect the firms’ profitability, consumer surplus, and social welfare by 
comparing with the benchmark pure-profit incentives.  
In equilibrium, we find that both owners always employ the CSR-related incentives for their 
managers, with the equilibrium reducing to the pure-profit (no CSR) incentives if the products 
are independent. With correlated products, equilibrium analysis suggests that the firms are CSR-
friendly under Cournot competition and CSR-unfriendly under Bertrand competition. By 
comparing with the benchmark pure-profit (no CSR) incentives we obtain the following 
managerial insights. First, the impact of the CSR-related managerial incentive design on the 
firms’ profitability depends on both the competition mode and product relationship. Second, the 
mode of competition is the only determinant for the impact of the CSR-related managerial 
incentive design on consumer surplus and social welfare.  
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Several possible extensions can be carried out in future research. First, the duopolistic 
setting can be extended to an oligopolistic framework to examine the effect of the number of 
firms on the CSR-related managerial incentive design. Second, this paper focuses on horizontal 
competition, while further research can investigate a vertical market structure in the context of 
supply chains. Third, we consider the simultaneous incentive design problem here, but sequential 
incentive design warrants further research. Finally, it is also worthwhile to examine incentive 
design with asymmetric firms.  
 
 
Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1.  
First, It is trivial to verify that 0Qi =  if 0 = . Next, we prove 0
Q
i   if ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  . 
Simple calculation shows that, both the denominator and numerator of Q
i  are positive if
( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  .  
Second, based on the solutions in Table 1, we have  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 3 2 4 2
2
2 2 2 4
4 1 2 4 2 1 4 8 4
, 1,2
2 2 4 8 4
Q
Q
OiOi i
        
    
 + − − − − + + + + +
  − = =
+ − + + + +
.  
It can be verified that 0
QQ
OiOi −   (a win-win outcome) for ( )1,0  − (products are 
complementary) and 0
QQ
OiOi −  (a lose-lose outcome) for ( )0,1  (products are 
substitutable).  
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
Since 
( )( )
( )
2 4 2
22 4
2 4 8 4
2 4 8 4 1
Q
i
     
    
+ + + + −
=
 + + + +
 has the same sign as  , which means Q
i
decreases in   when ( )1,0  −  (products are complementary), and increases in   when 
( )0,1   (products are substitutable).  
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Proof of Proposition 3.  
It is easy to verify that 
Q
QCS CS=  if 0 = . Next, we consider the case that 0  . 
 
( ) ( )
( )
2 4 2 2
2
2 2
4 22 1 4 4 2 2 4 8 4
4 22 2 4 8 4
QQCS CS
        
    
 
+ + + − − − + + + 
 − =
 
+ − + + + + 
 
.  
Since the term in the square brackets in the numerator is always positive for ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  , 
we have 0
Q
QCS CS−  .  
 
Proof of Proposition 4.  
One can easily check that 
Q
QSW SW=  if 0 = . Next, we examine the case that 0  . 
( ) ( )
( )
4 3 2 2 2
2
2 2
4 22 1 4 6 12 4 4 2 4 8 4
4 22 2 4 8 4
QQSW SW
          
    
 
+ − − − − − + + + + + + 
 − =
 
+ − + + + + 
 
.  
As the term in the square bracket in the numerator is always positive for ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  , we 
can verify that 0
Q
QSW SW−  .  
 
Proof of Proposition 5.  
First, it is easy to verify that 0Pi =  if 0 =  and 0
P
i   if ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  . Second, based 
on the solutions in Table 2, we have  
 
( )
( )( ) ( )
22 2 2
2
2 2
1 1
, 1,2
2 1 2 1 1
P
P
OiOi i
   
  
 − − −
  − = =
+ − + −
 .  
One can see that 0
PP
OiOi −   (a lose-lose outcome) for ( )1,0  −  (products are 
complementary) and 0
PP
OiOi −   (a win-win outcome) for ( )0,1   (products are 
substitutable).  
 
Proof of Proposition 6.  
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Since 
( )
3/2
1
P
i 
 

= −
 +
 has the opposite sign to  , which means P
i  increases in   when 
( )1,0  −  (products are complementary) and decreases in   when ( )0,1   (products are 
substitutable).  
 
Proof of Proposition 7.  
If 0 = , it is easy to see that 
P
PCS CS= . If 0  , we have 
 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
2 3 2 2
2
2 2
1 2 3 2 1
1 2 1 1
P
PCS CS
    
   
− − + − −
− =
+ − − + −
.  
Thus, we verify that 0
P
PCS CS−   if ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  .  
Proof of Proposition 8.  
If 0 = , it is trivial to check that 
P
PSW SW= . If 0  , one has 
 
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
2 2 2
2
2 2
1 3 2 1
2 1 2 1 1
P
PSW SW
    
  
− − + −
− = −
+ − + −
. 
Therefore, we can confirm that 0
PPSW SW−   for ( ) ( )1,0 0,1  −  .  
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